Just a PSA.

See this thread

Sorry to link to Reddit, but not only is the dev sloppily using using Claude to do something like 20k line PRs, but they are completely crashing out, banning people from the Discord (actually I think they wiped everything from Discord now), and accusing people forking their code of theft.

It’s a bummer because the app was pretty good… thankfully Calibre-web and Kavita still exist.

      • PoliteDudeInTheMood@lemmy.ca
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        8 days ago

        It’s not, the second I cloned it and gave codex access it found a whole whack of privacy issues. This was 100% human coded

        • fccview@lemmy.world
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          6 days ago

          degoog Dev here, definitely not vibecoded. Would you be able to tell me all these whack of privacy issues? I thought I had everything covered, but if you found something concerning it’d be nice to know before I get it out of beta :)

          • PoliteDudeInTheMood@lemmy.ca
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            6 days ago
            1. Fixed credential-exfiltration risk in /api/proxy/image: Previously the endpoint could:
            • accept arbitrary auth_id
            • load stored API keys
            • forward them to attacker-controlled URLs
            1. Enforced outbound host allowlist globally Previously:
            • allowlist existed
            • but outgoingFetch() didn’t enforce it
            • plugins/engines could bypass it
            1. Fixed extension store path traversal Previously a malicious store manifest could:
            • inject … paths
            • escape install directories
            • reference arbitrary files
            1. Hardened proxy IP trust Previously:
            • rate limiting trusted any X-Forwarded-For header
            • clients could spoof their IP
            1. Fixed inconsistent settings authentication Previously:
            • settings UI stored an auth token
            • but the settings modal didn’t send it when saving
            1. Implemented Improved proxy deployment support
            • Added proxy-aware behavior:
            • DEGOOG_PUBLIC_BASE_URL for canonical URLs
            • secure cookie handling when X-Forwarded-Proto=https

            Additional Improvements:

            • suggestion fetching hardened
            • DuckDuckGo suggestion parsing fixed
            • unified outbound request handling
            • install state guard properly cleaned up

            Made some other changes for my specific deployment. Very happy with your work so far. Thanks so much

            • fccview@lemmy.world
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              4 hours ago

              Hey sorry for the delay, dealing with a lot right now, but I didn’t forget about it.

              1 - Fixed this, the api key is now only forwarded if the destination hostname matches the plugin’s stored url. 2 - As I was saying, the allowlist is opt-in by design (null = allow all), and plugins legitimately need to make arbitrary outbound requests. Enforcing it globally would break the plugin system. 3 - Fixed this, it was quite simple 4 - I have added an env var (DEGOOG_DISTRUST_PROXY), if set to true it’ll make it so all users share the same rate limit regardless of their IPs, I left it as an opt in as most users currently running it are only keeping it private behind their own in house reverse proxies. This will be handy for a public instance for example 5 - Extension settings modal now correctly sends x-settings-token on save. 6 - As I said, auth is intentionally lax until a more structured auth system is added, may need to be a few weeks after stable is live, after all there’s no real auth and the setting password protected and private view should be secure enough as it is

              btw all this is not live yet, it’ll be sent live with the next release ♥

            • fccview@lemmy.world
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              6 days ago

              Thanks, I’ll individually look into all of these ♥️ I’ll say some of them are more conscious compromises for the sake of an open scalable system where third party extensions can truly edit anything (intentionally) and everything around Auth/secure cookie is also fairly lax due to the fact the Auth is just a protection for the settings (which literally stop the settings from being served by the client), in the moment I decide to add some more structured Auth system/maybe users I’ll look into proper secure cookie handling.

              This is an awesome report, thank you so much for sharing it!!!